Introduction 9 10
Over the past thirty years an ongoing programme of public sector reform 11 throughout the OECD has resulted in the increased marketization of public services, quality with regulatory incentives when public entities are granted considerable 36 managerial freedom and are subject to a risk based regulatory regime. 38 39 Whilst agency theory predicts the management of financial performance to 
49
Second, the incentive framework in the public sector is weak: the incidence of 50 51 performance related pay is low and has a focus on service delivery rather than performance is often low: regulators and funding providers often have the power and 4 5 resources to demand additional information which reduces the potential for disguising 6 underlying performance. These factors arguably combine to create a culture which is 7 8 inimical to the misleading of key stakeholders, such as regulators and the public, 9 10 about the underlying financial performance of the entity. However, NPM-inspired 11 reforms have undoubtedly strengthened the incentive framework and in this context 12 13 there has been some concern, and evidence, that such reforms erode and 'crowd out' for the management of reported financial performance have been increasing.
22
In not for profit entities, for example, Jegers (2010) has analysed the welfare, an issue also raised in a study of performance measurement practices in the additional research into performance measurement in the public sector with a view to 40 exploring the risks associated with current practice. This paper represents a response 42 to these calls.
44 45
Our setting is English National Health Service Foundation Trusts. Foundation
46
Trusts account for more than £30bn, roughly 30%, of UK annual public expenditure strategic development, over which they exercise a high degree of autonomy. return on assets, liquidity and performance against plan) and a 'prudential borrowing triggering of additional managerial autonomy.
25
Prior literature has explored accruals management in public sector entities 27 only in response to the financial breakeven benchmark and has found income 28 29
increasing (decreasing) discretionary accruals when pre-managed performance is 30 below (above) this benchmark and that public entities also manage discretionary reporting quality in the public sector by investigating the impact of a new form of 37 public sector regulation. We use discretionary accruals as our proxy for financial 38 39 reporting quality and, using data sourced from financial statements and the regulator's 40 reporting template, estimate a pre-managed risk rating and prudential borrowing limit.
42
We find that: first, discretionary accruals are income increasing (decreasing) for pre- profitability is greater in for-profit than not-for-profit hospitals. In the US not-for-
profit sector, the manipulation of accounting numbers has also been found in the form The risk rating system also has features which discourage year-end accruals forecasting is discouraged through the % of plan metric (see Figure 1) . However, liquidity which is consistent with a BBB credit rating. This is determined by reference
35
to four key ratios, based on annual plan projections, for which minimum levels of 37 performance are required. The ratios are dividend 4 cover, interest cover, debt service 38 39 cover and debt service as a % of revenue. The minimum levels of performance can be 40 seen in Figure 2 . Breach of any one of these thresholds, either on actual or revised 42 forecast performance, has the potential to trigger regulatory intervention and a 43 44 reduction in borrowing capacity, thereby creating an incentive to manage performance 45 to avoid breach of the prudential borrowing limit.
48 49
Insert Figure 2 To test these hypotheses we estimate discretionary accruals and investigate 51 52
whether there is any variation with the pre-managed risk-rating and with the 
Sample and data

7
Our sample includes all Foundation Trusts over the five year period from Monitor consolidation schedules as was data for the working capital facility 31 throughout the period of our study. 6 Plan data was not available and is therefore 32 33
omitted from our analysis.
35
Accruals modelling 36 37
In this paper, we adopt an aggregate accruals method. Although both 38 39 aggregate accruals and the specific accrual of depreciation have been investigated in study. 7 There also exists the possibility of exploiting long term provisions as a means organisational complexity or business model affect the level of discretionary accruals.
12
To calculate the pre-managed 'financial risk rating' we first compute the four We further investigate the influence on financial reporting quality of a pre- reported 'revenue available for debt service' (see Figure 2) .
36
However, whilst we predict accruals management in response to a potential would have resulted in a 3 rating) if the sum of the I/E rating and the ROA rating is 7, the sum of the
50
EBITDA and liquidity rating is 5, and the omitted plan rating is 4 or 5.
51
Similarly a trust can only be misclassified as a 3 rating (when inclusion of the plan rating would have 52 resulted in a 2 rating) if the plan rating is 2 and all the other metric ratings are 3.
53
Misclassifications bias our findings in favour of our hypotheses because, as in the example, above, 54 misclassification of a Trust as having a pre-managed risk rating of 3, where we predict no earnings 55 management, would result in an overestimation of discretionary accruals associated with this rating.
56
Similarly, misclassification of a Trust as having a pre-managed risk rating of 2, where we do predict 57 earnings management, would serve to underestimate the level of discretionary accruals associated 58 with this rating. setting.
7
The coefficient  on Pre-mSurp in equations 2 and 3 tests Hypothesis 1 and 8 9
we expect this coefficient to take a negative value to indicate income increasing represented by the pre-managed prudential borrowing limit) tests hypothesis 2a. We 
Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 44 45
Descriptive statistics for our sample which set the context for our 46 investigations are shown in Table 1 .
49 50
Insert expense is low at £0.3m but again with wide variability (min £-4.4m, max £9.6m).
41
Long term provisions amount to £1.8m (mean). Other figures in Table 1 We proceed to report in Table 2 each pre-managed rating of 1, 2, 3 and 4 or more (respectively) and Column 5 shows and significant in all cases at 1%. We can therefore reject the null hypothesis of no discretionary accruals additionally vary with the pre-managed financial risk rating. Column 5 shows that when the pre-managed risk ratings are taken together, Trusts. Location however has no impact, and size, although statistically significant 38 39 (p<0.05), has no economic significance (coefficient =0.00).
Taken together our findings are consistent with the management of accruals to there is a pre-managed surplus and are more so when the pre-managed surplus is well 49 50 above intervention triggering thresholds).
52 53
Insert risk rating may therefore be less amenable to management.
27
Overall, the levels of additional discretionary accruals at 1-2% of assets (£2- results are shown in Table 6 . They are consistent with those in Insert Insert We also test whether discretionary accruals in the intervals just above the Table 8 . We find no evidence of additional discretionary accruals in these 9 10 performance bands.
12 13
Insert Table 8 
35
With similar coefficients and levels of significance, these findings are robust 'better' financial performance would be helpful in informing regulatory design.
10
Finally, we find that the management of discretionary accruals is driven by 11 12
two metrics of strategic significance, the I&E surplus margin and the prudential decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24 (1), 99-126.
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All terms and definitions are taken from the regulator's compliance framework.
26
1 This is broadly equivalent to a return on capital measure. It is calculated as the income and expenditure surplus
28
(after deduction of finance costs but before the dividend on public dividend capital) divided by taxpayers' equity plus debt (including Private Finance Initiative balances and finance leases). The public dividend is a 29 fixed charge of 3.5% on taxpayers' equity and thus essentially resembles a cost of capital charge rather more 30 than a dividend. 
39
The final 'financial risk rating' is the weighted average of the metric scores as illustrated below: 40 41
Derivation of a Foundation Trust 'financial risk rating': An illustration 43
Example: Trust X has an I&E surplus margin of 0.8%, an ROA of 3.5%, an EBITDA margin of 6.2%, Dependent variable = discretionary accruals.
30
The derivation of a Trust's financial risk rating can be found in Figure 1 .
32 33
A risk rating of 2 triggers regulatory intervention in the form of additional reporting requirements but can 34 escalate for a risk rating of 1 to more direct intervention and ultimately to removal of the Board and
35
Governing Body.
